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Abstract 
The European Water Framework Directive encourages pricing policy reforms in order to protect the 
environmental quality of water and promote its efficient use. This paper deals with two aspects of efficiency, 
namely economic and environmental efficiency, analyzed for different pricing methods. Volumetric pricing 
methods are compared with other indirect schemes (‘per area’, on ‘input’, on ‘output’ and ‘quota’) under three 
different water saving scenarios. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique is used to assess the 
eco-efficiency of an eventual water pricing reform in the irrigated agricultural system of Capitanata, in Italy. 
Overall, findings point out that a pricing system based on ‘per area’ and ‘output’ will lead to the highest 
eco-efficiency, although this is not valid under any water pricing charge. The enforcement of water saving via 
pricing does not imply a higher eco-efficiency, mainly in the case of environmental efficiency. The use of the 
DEA approach appears useful in the assessment of water pricing policies where conflictive economic and 
environmental goals arise. It provides a methodology to support policy makers in the design of water policy 
pricing aimed at the enhancement of efficiency, both economic and environmental. 
Keywords: eco-efficiency, data envelopment analysis, water pricing scheme, irrigation 
1. Introduction 
The enhancement of water use efficiency is one of the priorities of the European Water Framework Directive 
(WFD), which sets the target of achieving a sustainable use of water that guarantees the good ecological status of 
all water bodies. The most relevant impact from its implementation is expected on the agricultural sector, since it 
accounts for 60-80% of the overall demand (Dworak et al., 2007). To achieve its objectives, the WFD prescribes 
the use of economic tools and principles, such as the full cost recovery of water services, and the polluter pays 
principle (Martin-Ortega, 2012).  
In this regard, a water-pricing reform would (directly or indirectly) “[. . .] provide adequate incentives for users 
to use water resources efficiently, and thereby contribute to the environmental objectives of this directive”, as 
stated by Article 9 of the WFD. This paper is aimed at providing scientific support to the implementation of the 
WFD in this respect, by assessing the efficiency of several water pricing policies for irrigation. The volumetric 
pricing is commonly believed to be more effective because payments are directly linked to actual delivered water 
(Dono, Giraldo, & Severini, 2010). However, its implementation is hindered by some technical difficulties, such 
as the application of metering devices to different kinds of water sources (streams, natural reservoirs, 
groundwater, wells, etc.); and their monitoring and surveillance (Molle & Berkoff, 2007). Moreover, volumetric 
systems are costly and, as it is pointed out by Tsur and Dinar (1997), in some areas the efficiency gains may not 
be sufficient to cover the costs for water pricing reform. This paper tries to address the research question of 
whether alternative pricing schemes may also be suitable (or eventually better) for the achievement of WFD’s 
environmental objectives in accordance with its economic efficiency principles.  
The main added value of this research relates to the joint assessment of economic and environmental efficiency. 
Economic efficiency relates to the adequate allocation of the water resource among different irrigated crops, and 
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its capacity to generate economic outputs. Environmental efficiency relates to the capacity of pricing schemes to 
reduce externalities caused by irrigated agriculture on the environment. These two concepts, when considered 
together, yield the measure of eco-efficiency. The assessment is performed by simultaneously considering 
technical input, negative environmental externality (i.e. undesirable) and economic outputs (i.e. desirable) (Färe, 
Grosskopf, Lovell, & Pasurka, 1989; Titeca, 1996; Kuosmanen & Kortelainen, 2005; Picazo-Tadeo, 
Gómez-Limóm & Reig-Martínez, 2011). This approach represents a contribution to the literature since at present, 
most studies concerning water productive efficiency follows an agronomic approach (yield per drop) or an 
engineering approach (conveyed water per available water) (see Malano & Burton, 2001) for a comprehensive 
list of the water efficiency indicators) and do not look at eco-efficiency as a measurement of global performance 
of irrigated agriculture, ignoring the fact that conflicting economic and environmental objectives may emerge.  
Particular focus is placed here on insights into the improvement of eco-efficiency stemming from a water policy 
reform in agriculture adopting a macro-level perspective. More specifically, eco-efficiency is defined here as the 
ratio between economic value added and some indicators of environmental pressures such as nitrogen balance 
and risk of pesticides. The analysis is carried out at regional scale for the agricultural system as a whole. The 
study refers to the catchment of the irrigation basin named ‘Consorzio della Bonifica della Capitanata’ (CBC), 
which is located in the province of Foggia (Apulia region), Italy. Results are, nevertheless, expected to be of 
relevance at the wider level in Europe, where other water scarce regions face similar water management issues.  
To address the research objectives, the overall effects of alternative hypothetical water pricing schemes are firstly 
simulated by a regional linear programming model (LP). Then, the assessment of the eco-efficiency is 
undertaken through a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The use of simulated date to feed into DEA has 
already proven appropriate by the literature (e.g., Musolino & Rindone, 2009; Bono & Matranga, 2005). Raju 
and Kumar (2006) used DEA to select the most suitable irrigation planning alternative in the context of the Sri 
Ram Sagar Project in Andhra Pradesh (India). In this research, simulated data allows avoiding the interferences 
on the efficiency due to other external factors. As consequence, efficiency gains are more clearly related to the 
water policy change.  
This combination of LP and DEA represents another added value of this research. Simply using the LP model 
outputs and accounting for the implied changes due to different pricing policies goes into largely argued 
problems of multi-input/multi-output production processes evaluation (Gómez-Limón & Sanchez-Fernandez, 
2010). Indeed, inputs, outputs, and externalities can be measured in physical or value terms, but the most 
difficult task is the comparison of different performances. The greatest difficulty involves interpreting the 
combination of indicators selected to describe each policy effect, and therefore to be suitable as a practical 
administrative decision-support tool (Messner, 2006). Instead, DEA technique is expected to overcome the usual 
trade-off amongst the conflicting objectives as economic and environmental, as well as the possible 
commensurability and aggregation biases of different indicators. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reports the main topics of water pricing policy options. 
Section 3 follows, where the empirical case and alternative pricing schemes are compared. Section 4, presents 
the methodology based on the two-stage DEA approach. Results are presented in Section 5 while conclusions are 
drawn in Section 6.  
2. The Water Pricing Policies 
It has been stated that the most suitable water pricing scheme to encourage users to limit their water is one based 
on volumetric billing use (Easter & Liu, 2005). The shortcomings of a volumetric approach have also been 
discussed in literature. For instance, Dono, Giraldo, and Severini (2010) analyze the economics effects and 
impacts of water usage of a volumetric approach with respect to an area based method. They point out that 
charge increases via volumetric schemes could stimulate groundwater withdrawal. Generally, criticisms of the 
volumetric methods for water irrigation management in semi-arid regions and other relevant water pricing 
methods have been argued (Viaggi, Raggi, Bartolini, & Gallerani, 2010; Molle, Venot, & Hassan, 2008). In 
addition, it has been largely recognized that the implemantation of direct methods in large irrigation districts 
implies the adoption of appropriate water metering devices, which in turn may require massive investment for 
their setting and monitoring (Molle & Berkoff, 2007; Burt, 2007). 
There are many papers dealing with water pricing for irrigation and efficiency issue (Tsur & Dinar, 1995; Dinar 
& Subramanian, 1997; Johansson, Tsur, Roe, Doukkali, & Dinar, 2002). Basically, they show that the gain in 
efficiency is often not prevalent with respect to the implementation costs and obstacles related to volumetric 
pricing implementation (Tsur & Dinar, 1997).  
While research focusing on economic issues, often at farm level, are largely available (e.g. Bazzani, Di Pasquale, 
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Gallerani, & Viaggi, 2004; Ortega, de Juan, & Tarjuelo, 2004; Speelman et al., 2009), how volumetric pricing 
affects the environmental efficiency of irrigation systems have received less attention. Important contributions 
have been made by some authors in the field of policy analysis towards non-point source control in irrigated 
agriculture. Most of these papers refer to the cost and environmental effectiveness of measures such as eco-tax, 
permits trading, land use restrictions, nitrate pollution reduction at the farm (O’Shea & Wade, 2009) or at 
regional level (Martínez & Albiac, 2004; Volk, Lierscha, & Schmidt, 2009). However, most of the mentioned 
studies, which focus on farm impacts, are crop specific and none of these explicitly tackle the eco-efficiency of 
water use as a consequence of water pricing changes.  
Moreover, there is the issue of whether alternative pricing schemes might perform better than volumetric billing 
when both economic and environmental efficiency are considered. To address this research gap, six water pricing 
schemes are compared here. Simple volumetric schemes and increasing block tariffs are the direct systems, 
whereas the indirect pricing schemes are area, input, output and quota pricing: 
a) Volumetric schemes are based on the amount of water delivered. The price should be set equal to the 
marginal cost (i.e. financial, environmental and, resources costs) of providing the water from the 
economic optimal pricing rule. This pricing method, easily understood, leads farmers to use water 
efficiently until the economic marginal value equals the marginal cost. The main disadvantage of this 
method is that it requires meters and it has considerable implementation costs. In addition, 
environmental impacts of irrigation are not always linked with the amount of water used;  
b) Increasing block tariffs involves varying the water price when water use for a set time period exceeds a 
set volume. The amount of the first block is considered as the basic amount of water needed to support a 
farm. Farmers pay a low rate for the first block but a higher price for subsequent ones. In a similar 
fashion to volumetric scheme, environmental consequences stemming from irrigation practices are not 
directly accounted for;  
c) Per acre fees: pricing based on area is widespread around the world and, is still the most common 
pricing method in many developing countries. Basically, farmer’s payment refers to the extension of 
irrigated area regardless of the actual demand of water. In some advanced regions, per area fees are 
differentiated taking into account the average irrigation requirement of each crop. Per area method can 
be easily implemented and is relatively less costly than direct methods. With reference to likely 
shortcoming, criticism rises to the fact that farmers do not have any economic incentive to adopt 
water-saving technologies; 
d) Input pricing: this type of pricing scheme falls into indirect methods, given that payment for irrigation is 
based on other related inputs, such as seeds, plants, mulching materials, etc. Essentially, it is applied an 
extra charge to those inputs instead to pay directly for water. To some extent, this scheme is coherent 
with the polluter pays principle; 
e) Output pricing: inversely to input methods, with this scheme payment is due to on the bases of 
economic value of irrigated production. Similarly to the value added tax, output scheme can be defined 
as percentage of market value of irrigated crops;  
f) Quota: actually, this scheme is not purely considered as pricing method. In fact, with the quota scheme 
instead to vary price (scheme and/or charge), water allotment is progressively reduced. This method is 
recognized being more equitable and, in many developing countries is largely applied. Quota can be 
defined annually, per crop and, sometime under drought condition, on the bases of priority schedules. 
Inaccurate tariffs setting may lead to economic inefficiency, mostly if water charge results lower than 
the average marginal productivity.  
3. Materials 
3.1 Area Description 
The case study relates to a flat area served by irrigation infrastructures, managed by the local irrigation district 
called ‘Consorzio per la Bonifica della Capitanata’ (CBC) and located in the south of Italy. The area covers 442 
000 ha as a whole, but irrigation infrastructure covers only 135 000 ha. The infrastructure consists of a network 
of underground pipelines through which high-pressure water is conveyed to the farm plots. Therefore, the water 
supply is available on demand.  
Water is stored in a complex system of dams, small rivers and artificial lakes, and annual availability depends 
strictly upon weather conditions, being an area characterised by a Mediterranean climate with cold wet winters 
and hot dry summers. Essentially, rainfall varies from 400 to 700 mm/year, but there are also recurrent periods of 
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drought. The annual water stock amounts to 150 million m3, and it is devoted to urban, industrial and agricultural 
uses. In the case of water shortage urban use is given priority. The irrigation board delivers annually about 106 
million m3 to irrigation purposes, but water restrictions are also common depending on rainfall patterns.  
As a whole, agriculture is the main water user in the area, accounting for 80% of renewable resources, and while 
irrigated areas cover a smaller share of farmland (24%), in terms of value added, it shares 70% of total 
agricultural economic production. Thus, the agricultural sector accounts for 6.8% of GDP and around 11.7% of 
employment (CCIAA, 2009). 
The irrigation network was completed in the 1960s. From then, traditional rain fed agriculture based on pastures 
and winter cereals, has been converting to more intensive agriculture (fresh cut vegetables, processed tomatoes, 
orchard fruits, olive groves, vineyards), which in turn has also been stimulating the withdrawal of groundwater 
sources. Indeed private wells have been largely drilled without strict control from the public authority. There is 
no official data on the actual groundwater extractions, and the share of water use from private wells annually 
varies according to CBC availability. Normally it is estimated at 45%, but raises dramatically during 
exceptionally long drought periods to up to 100% (D’Arcangelo, Nardella, & Rodio, 2005). 
Water resources from CBC are allocated through a system of water rights, while groundwater is managed by 
farmers as a private asset. Although the CBC is a private consortium of landowners, it is empowered by the 
public authority (the Apulia Region) to manage the conveyed water from the reservoirs. Landowners have 
received water use rights by a system coupled with their own land, for an overall amount of water rights which is 
proportional to the land served by the infrastructure. The use rights are strictly linked with the land and water 
markets are not allowed. With regard to groundwater, farmers could drill private wells and set all of the 
necessary equipment for pumping, storage, and delivering water to the crop fields. Lastly, reform to control the 
excessive exploitation of this resource was introduced in 2008 through the Regional Law No 9 on May 2008 
(PUGLIA, L.R.n.9/2008) which introduced the banning of new authorizations and the control by temporal 
licences for existing wells. 
The CBC currently applies a volumetric pricing method, based on an increasing tiered rate system. The revenue 
collected by the CBC is currently covering the financial costs only, while resources and environmental costs are 
still not included. In the case of groundwater, farmers face only the private cost of water extraction. 
According to the WFD requirements, the regional environmental agency started in 2008 a monitoring action 
aimed at defining the status of all water bodies in the region. The actions collected data depicting a critical status 
of quality worsening, mostly due to the salinization process caused by groundwater overexploitation that has 
induced the infiltration of sea water. In addition, pollutants such as nitrates, pesticides and organic carbon have 
been recognized amongst the most important environmental concerns about water quality status (PTA, 2009).  
3.2 Specification of Alternative Water Pricing for the Area Study 
Alternative pricing methods are implemented as follows: 
a) P0. Baseline: Water pricing currently consists of a fixed annual fee per hectare (around 15 EUR/ha), and 
an increasing block system of tiered tariffs, therefore farmers pay accordingly to their actual 
consumption. A tariff of 0.09 €/m3 for consumption up to 2050 m3/ha, and 0.18 €/m3 for additional 950 
m3/ha are applied. Finally, volumes exceeding 3000 m3/ha are charged at 0.24 €/m3. In the case of 
groundwater, as abovementioned, farmers carry only the private cost estimated at 0.09 €/m3 (Noviello & 
Nardella, 2005; Giannoccaro, Prosperi, Valente, & Zanni, 2009); meanwhile, no resource and 
environmental costs are due; 
b) P1. Full volumetric (Full Vol.): It is assumed that the current three-tiered rate system to CBC water is 
maintained. In addition, it is hypothesized as the introduction of a simply volumetric method for 
groundwater, reflecting the resource cost. In absence of any other estimate, a tariff of 0.03 €/m3 is 
assumed. Therefore, farmers will pay the current private cost of 0.09 €/m3 plus the new volumetric 
charge of 0.03 €/m3; 
c) P2. Input: The introduction of an indirect method in which the water charge is calculated on the input 
required by irrigated crops is assumed (e.g. plants or seeds, consumable irrigation equipments, 
ferti-irrigation materials). To reflect an indirect environmental tax on irrigation practices, farmers pay a 
sort of price surcharge on these inputs, regardless of the actual water consumption (from CBC and 
groundwater source). The surcharge is different for each crop, and set up on a basis of average crop 
water consumption;  
d) P3. Output: The water consumption is charged proportionally to the gross return from irrigated crops, 
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regardless of the water source. The charge rate applied to each crop is calculated as a ratio between the 
current value of its specific water consumption, and the corresponding gross return (vines 3%, 
horticultural crops 2.4-2.8%, olive orchards 1.9%); 
e) P4. Area: A per-area pricing is assumed referring to the area suitable for the irrigation practice, 
regardless of water sources. A per-area hectare charge is set equivalent to the average CBC cost per 
hectare of irrigated area (82 €/ha); 
f) P5. Quota: A constant water tariff (0.09 €/m3) is applied, but subject to a rigid constraint on water 
availability for each farm. This method is popular among some farmers, as they claim that water prices 
should remain low and constant, regardless of water availability. Although it is not resulting from a real 
water market, they accept the concept that the availability may change according to the rainfall regime. 
In addition, these water methods are analyzed under different water saving scenarios A, B, C, involving 10, 20 
and 30% of water savings respectively. Tariffs are progressively increased according to pricing methods in order 
to get the established target of water saving. In the case of the quota scheme, tariffs are kept constant meanwhile 
water allotments are progressively reduced until each target scenario is obtained. Thus, moving from one pricing 
policy to another of them would give the policy maker a range of pricing feasibility that can be compared across 
the 6 pricing schemes that are used. As a whole, 18 water policy options are taken into account for running DEA 
analysis.  
3.3 Data Collection 
Data are obtained from Giannoccaro, Prosperi and Zanni (2010) where the effects of the water policy scenarios 
as mentioned above are performed through a linear programming model at the regional level, in which farmers 
are expected to maximize their profits. In other words, under all irrigation policy hypothesis farmers will pursue 
the optimal economic allocation of the resource. Therefore, water pricing changes could induce changes in 
farmers’ behaviours towards use of water resource as well as all other farming inputs.  
Farms were classified into three main groups according to farm size and cropping patterns (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Farm typologies in the area 
  Small Medium Large Total Basin 
Number of farms 18,199 13,063 4,720 35,982 
Average size (ha) 2.5 10 43 380,000 
Irrigated land (ha) 1.2 2.9 11.6 80,000 
Share on Basin farmland (%) 10 30 60 100 
Share on Basin irrigated land (%) 3 47 50 100 
Cropping patterns (within farm)       
Durum wheat 40% 68% 75%   
Orchards 50% 20% 9%   
Vegetables 3% 7% 7%   
Others 7% 5% 9%   
Source: Adapted from ISTAT (2000). 
 
The resource constraint for water is specified in order to align with the water delivery schedule from the CBC 
(monthly), which delivers some 106 million m3 between April and November. In the case of the non-CBC water 
source, there are constraints with regard to delivery, and availability is estimated at 89 million m3 at the most. 
The regional model is performed under short period assumptions with farm size and water rights being set as 
constant. As a consequence, the decision variables of the model are basically referred to the optimal cropping 
mix, which determines the utilization of production inputs (land, labour and capital) including water and 
chemicals, as well as economic outputs measured in terms of value added.  
From the optimal solution of each water policy option, the variables of input, output and externalities are 
obtained. Detail of variables units are hold in Table 2. 
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Conventional inputs are land, labour, capital and water. The latter variable accounts for both surface water 
delivered by the CBC, and groundwater withdrawals. Value added refers to the difference between gross output 
(i.e. economic value of productions at the market prices) and intermediate consumptions (i.e. goods and services) 
used. Intermediate costs refer to seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, energy, and other services used in the farming 
processes. Finally, CAP regime and its relative financial supports are not included in the value added. Thus, it is 
a measure of the contribution of the agriculture (irrigated and rain fed as a whole) to the economic wealth. 
 
Table 2. Inputs, output and externalities  
 Conventional Resources  Environmental Externalities 
 Input Desirable Output Undesirable outputs 
 Land Labour Capital Water Value added Pesticides Risk Nitrogen Surplus 
Units 103 hectares 103 hours 106 EUR 106 m3 106 EUR 103 Kg 106 t 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Pesticide risk pjc for crop c is modelled as follow: 
 
t
t
jc DLap jt 50/1000000  (1) 
Where ajt amount of active matter t by unit of pesticide j; DL50t is the lethal dose 50 of the active matter t 
usually reported on commercial product. The indicator represents the weight (in kilograms) of the population of 
rats, 50% of which would be potentially killed by 1 Kg/L of the pesticide. In this context it represents a proxy of 
the environmental hazard (for chief details see OECD, 2001, p. 149). 
Nitrate surplus is the physical difference between nitrogen inputs and outputs from an agricultural system, per 
hectare of agricultural land (see OECD, 2001, p. 20).  
Data on pesticides risk and nitrate surplus are from Giannoccaro et al. (2009). Values are calculated for each crop 
(per hectare of farmland) on the basis of technical and agronomic farming practices normally adopted by farmers 
in the area. 
All the above variables are referred to the agricultural system as the aggregation of overall farms. The pay-off 
matrix obtained through the simulation process is reported in the appendix. 
4. Methodology 
Two main techniques are suitable for the analysis of the efficiency: the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and the 
data envelopment analysis (DEA). The typical statistical approach to evaluate the efficiency is characterised as a 
central-tendency approach, which evaluates producers relative to an average producer. To do that, in SFA the 
shape of function is prior defined. In contrast, DEA is an extreme-point method and compares each producer 
with only the ‘best’ producers1. This methodology is useful whenever there is no information about the relative 
importance among outputs or inputs, as it does not require assumptions a priori (Callens & Tyteca, 1999). 
Additionally, DEA deals with variables regardless of their unit measure, provided that these units are the same 
for every entity (Coelli, Prasada Rao, & Batteste, 1997). In this regard, we adopted the DEA since our research 
encompasses ecological aspects therefore, the unnecessary assignment of weights for environmental resources 
and impacts, allows us to proceed with a more objective analysis. 
The first non-parametric analysis to compare multiple desirable and undesirable outputs is reported in Färe, 
Grosskopf, Lovell and Pasurka (1989). However, the general emphasis on the environmental issue has occurred 
later (Tyteca 1996, presents an exhaustive literature review), where externalities have usually been treated as 
‘undesirable outputs’ of the production process (e.g., Fernandez-Cornejo 1994; Tyteca, 1996; Piot-Lepetit, 
Vermersch, & Weaver, 1997). Another possibility is to envision the undesirable outputs as inputs (see Seiford 
and Zhu (2002) for either approach). As in De Koeijer, Wossink, Struik and Renkema (2002) here environmental 
effects are modelled as conventional inputs.  
In the present research, the DEA method is adopted with the aim of measuring the eco-efficiency of different 
irrigation pricing policies, as first applied by Korhonen and Luptacik (2004). Korhonen and Luptacik (2004) 
measured the eco-efficiency of 24 power plants in Europe in two steps. Essentially, conventional efficiency and 
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the so-called environmental efficiency are estimated separately, then, by combining both efficiencies, the 
eco-efficiency score is obtained.  
As mentioned in the introduction, eco-efficiency here is defined as the ratio between economic value added and 
environmental pressures. Indeed, this paper focuses on a broader measure of productivity (i.e. economic value 
added), which is achieved by using all the resources (capital, labour, land and water) available. At the same time, 
externalities (i.e. nitrate surplus and pesticides risk) are also taken into account2. The final result consists of an 
efficiency score that takes into account all resources used, as well as the externalities released to the environment. 
By construction, this score of eco-efficiency is upper bounded to one, the score that represents best performance. 
Moreover, the lower the score computed the lower eco-efficiency. Scores computed measures eco-efficiency in a 
Farrell-Debreu sense (Farrell, 1957), as they are assessing equiproportional or radial reductions of environmental 
pressures necessary to attain eco-efficiency.  
Let us consider the n water pricing policies and the effects simulated, namely the amount of m inputs and k 
outputs estimated through the mathematical programming model. In particular, for m=1,2,...i, the subscript for 
production inputs is assigned (here land, labour, capital and water), while for m= i+1,i+2,...p, the externalities 
are specified (here nitrate surplus and pesticide risk indicators are seen as inputs); at the same time, for k=1,2,..,r, 
the subscript for conventional outputs is identified (here value added).  
Firstly, the relative economic efficiency is performed by the Input-Oriented CRS model which assumes constant 
returns of scale3. In this step the efficiency of the policy '0' (h0) is calculated through a linear programming 
model whose optimal solution provides the (positive) weights to be applied to outputs (μr) and inputs (νi), in 
order to find a ratio of output on inputs that ranges from 0 to 1: 
 Max h0 = ( Σkr=1 μr yr0 ) / ( Σ
m
i=1
 νi xi0) (2) 
s.t. 
( Σk
r=1
 μr yrj ) / ( Σmi=1 νj xij ) <= 1 , j = 1,2,…,n 
μr, νj => ε , r=1,2,…,k ; i=1,2,…,m 
ε>0 (Non-Archimedean) 
Scores of radial efficiency, which in turn represents the proportional potential reduction of all conventional 
inputs (land, labour, capital and water) while value added are held constant, have been estimated by solving 
expression (2) for each water policy. 
Secondly, the measurement of the environmental efficiency (g0), through the calculation of the weights to be 
applied to the desirable outputs (μr) and the undesirable outputs (μs) is run according to the follow equation: 
 Max g0 = ( Σkr=1 μr yr0 ) / ( Σ
p
s=m+1
 μs ys0) (3) 
s.t. 
( Σk
r=1
 μr yrj ) / ( Σps=m+1 μs ysj ) <= 1 , j = 1,2,…,n 
μr => ε , r=1,2,…,p 
ε>0 (Non-Archimedean)  
Specific environmental efficiency scores by policies have been calculated according to the expression (3). 
At this point, it is possible to combine the results of both models as the output variables for the new DEA model 
(with the inputs equal to 1), in order to find an indicator for eco-efficiency. 
The input-oriented version of this model estimates eco-efficiency by reducing both inputs and undesirable 
outputs while keeping desirable outputs constant. The eco-efficiency score thus indicates the extent to which 
both inputs and undesirable outputs can be reduced simultaneously.  
5. Results and Discussion 
This section reports and discusses firstly economic and environmental efficiency separately then the 
eco-efficiency analysis is shown. Table 3 shows the results of the DEA analysis. 
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Table 3. Efficiency scores for several policy options 
Policy options 
Economic 
efficiency  
Environmental 
efficiency  
A_P0.Baseline 0.95658 0.95729 
A_P1.Full_Vol. 0.95658 0.95729 
A_P2.Input 0.97913 0.95701 
A_P3.Output 0.98335 1.00000 
A_P4.Area 1.00000 1.00000 
A_P5.Quota 0.96723 0.96360 
B_P0.Baseline 0.93426 0.89527 
B_P1. Full_Vol. 0.93466 0.89438 
B_P2.Input 0.96018 0.88980 
B_P3.Output 0.95065 0.88523 
B_P4.Area 1.00000 0.92847 
B_P5.Quota 0.88918 0.85174 
C_P0.Baseline 0.94600 0.86403 
C_P1. Full_Vol. 0.95582 0.87217 
C_P2.Input 0.98499 0.81452 
C_P3.Output 0.90537 0.75500 
C_P4.Area 0.94834 0.79116 
C_P5.Quota 0.87474 0.77874 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
5.1 Economic Efficiency 
On the basis of economic efficiency scores (first column in Table 3), only two options out of the 18 simulated 
reach rate 1, being the best efficiency score. They correspond to water pricing based on per area, at the water 
saving scenarios A and B. The lowest score is reached by the quota pricing for a 30% water saving (scenario C) 
with a value of 0.87474. The average efficiency of the sample is 0.95150 while median is 0.95620, and generally 
slight differences are found with the standard deviation being 0.035. According to these results it is not proven 
that the implementation of volumetric pricing will necessarily lead to a higher economic efficiency in 
comparison to other methods.  
These outcomes show, in the first place, that water policy options taken into account here are rather efficient. 
These findings imply that there exists little difference in terms of technical efficiency among the different water 
pricing options. Thus, water policy reforms in the study area could scarcely increase efficiency of irrigated 
agricultural and, therefore of the agricultural system as a whole. 
Nevertheless, some consideration should be discussed. Firstly, it should be noticed that while only 8 out of 18 
options have a score lower than the mean or median, all of these fall into B and C water charge scenarios. 
Likewise, the per-area scheme which is the best option under A and B saving scenarios turns to an inefficient 
score in the case of scenario C. Indeed, it loses almost 6% of efficiency. B and C scenarios respectively consider 
a water reduction at basin level of 20 and 30% with respect to the current use, therefore powering water saving 
via pricing charges, does not seem lead to an improved (economic) efficiency of the agricultural sector. Secondly, 
current systems of water charge (Baseline) reach efficiency levels always under the mean. Regardless of the 
water saving scenario, the increasing block system currently implemented in the area is not efficient enough.  
5.2 Environmental Efficiency 
Environmental efficiency provides an indication of how the externalities can be reduced in the production 
process of agricultural systems, while continuing to produce the same value added. 
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The average efficiency of the sample (Table 3, column at right) is 0.89198 with the median at 0.89209. Generally, 
major differences are found when comparing this ranking with the one obtained by accounting only for 
economic aspects. In fact, the standard deviation is 0.074 and 9 out of 18 water options reach scores lower than 
the mean or median. Finally, only 2 out of 18 options are the most efficient, Area-based and Output-based 
methods. Both methods reach the highest level under water charge scenario A.  
On the other hand, the worst efficiency level is shown in the case of the Output-based pricing alternative in the 
water saving scenario C, where almost 25% of inefficiency with respect to the most efficient alternative is found. 
Quota methods are always inefficient, regardless of the water saving scenario. The input pricing method reaches 
a lower efficiency due to an excess of environmental externalities.  
Taking into account the most efficient options, it should be noticed that all water pricing policies take place in 
the water saving scenario A. At the same time, water saving scenarios B and C hold the worst options.  
As in the case of economic efficiency, findings here suggest that an increase in water pricing charges does not 
result in an environmental efficiency improvement. In this regard, changes in the environmental impacts as well 
as value added for the Baseline pricing method are reported in Figure 1, where the ‘status-quo’ indicates the 
current level for the three variables, and the levels A, B, and C, report the change in these variables according to 
the water saving scenarios. As figure shows, the externalities (i.e. Nitrate surpluses and Pesticides risk) show a 
smaller decrease with respect to the value added along the water saving scenarios. As a consequence, if the 
enforcement of tariffs is applied value added goes down more than nitrate and pesticides indicators.  
The fact that the overall-use of other non-water inputs decreases together with water use is found in most studies 
(Gómez-Limón, Riesgo & Arriaza, 2004; Manos et al., 2006; Bartolini, Bazzani, Gallerani, Raggi, & Viaggi, 
2007; Speelman et al., 2009). Nevertheless, our approach allows for assessing the most efficient water pricing 
that ensures reducing these externalities as little as possible meanwhile the value added is held constant.  
Overall, findings point out that a pricing system based on per area and output will lead to the highest efficiency 
although this is not valid under any water pricing charge. At the same time, this implies that the current pricing 
method (Baseline) is not the most environmentally efficient. 
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Figure 1. Change in value added, Nitrate and Pesticides indicatorsaccording to water saving scenarios for the 
Baseline pricing scheme 
 
5.3 Eco-Efficiency 
We turn now to the analysis of both economic and environmental efficiency simultaneously (i.e. second step of 
modified DEA technique). The eco-efficiency scores of different water pricing policies are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Computed score of eco-efficiency  
A_P0.Baseline 0.95729 B_P0.Baseline 0.93426 C_P0.Baseline 0.94600 
A_P1. Full_Vol. 0.95729 B_P1. Full_Vol. 0.93466 C_P1. Full_Vol. 0.95582 
A_P2.Input 0.97913 B_P2.Input 0.96018 C_P2.Input 0.98499 
A_P3.Output 1.00000 B_P3.Output 0.95065 C_P3.Output 0.90537 
A_P4.Area 1.00000 B_P4.Area 1.00000 C_P4.Area 0.94834 
A_P5.Quota 0.96723 B_P5.Quota 0.88918 C_P5.Quota 0.87474 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
From the findings in Table 4, only three options out of the 18 simulated reach the highest eco-efficiency levels. 
They are the options A_P4.Area, B_P4.Area and A_P3.Output. It should be stressed that two out of three best 
options are pricing schemes based on per area, and two out of the three best options fall into the saving scenario 
A; the water saving scenario C does not account for any option. Again, the lowest score is reached by the quota 
method in the case of the water saving scenario C, with a value of 0.87474. The average eco-efficiency of the 
sample is 0.94924 while median is 0.95065, and generally slight differences are found with the standard 
deviation being 0.036. Finally, 7 out of 18 options have a score lower than the mean or menidan and, all of these, 
fall into B and C water saving scenarios. 
According to the results of this analysis, it is not proven that the implementation of the volumetric pricing will 
necessarily lead to a higher eco-efficiency in comparison to other methods. The main result of this research is 
that the area-based pricing method is the most eco-efficient. At the same time, the output method where the 
water payment is linked with the economic return of irrigated crops emerges as an interesting alternative. Finally, 
as expected from the literature the quota scheme is always the least efficient.  
Basically, while the results point out the relatively small magnitude of gains in eco-efficiency derived from the 
water policy reforms, major concerns arise from the charge levels, at which pricing policies are set. Indeed, both 
economic and environmental efficiency do not show any efficiency improvement if the water tariffs are enforced 
regardless of the pricing schemes implemented. This aspect is again found for the eco-efficiency indicators 
which combine the two previous indicators. If the charge is increased, only per area pricing shows an efficient 
performance, although extreme enforcement which takes place under the scenario C produces the same 
efficiency loss. 
In regard to pricing schemes currently adopted within the irrigation basin (Baseline), findings here show that the 
present situation is not the most efficient, although magnitude of improvement in eco-efficiency by introducing a 
new pricing scheme (i.e. per area charge) is at least less than 5%. However, it is worth mentioning that the 
eco-efficiency score here refers to the overall agricultural sector thus smaller variation in the eco-efficiency score 
can results in larger reduction of inputs and environmental impacts, meanwhile the value added is kept constant. 
In addition, taking into account the fact that volumetric schemes might imply an inherent additional cost and, 
since indirect methods, namely per area schemes are claimed to be easily implemented (Tsur & Dinar, 1997), 
they might be preferable, without significant losses in terms of efficiency. 
In order to determine whether the final eco-efficiency score is mainly linked with the economic or environmental 
aspects, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (R) is computed, which is useful to determine the measure of 
association between ranks obtained by two different approaches (Gibbons, 1971). Spearman R values of 1, 0 and 
-1, represent perfect association, no association and perfect disagreement respectively between the approaches. 
The result of non parametric test is 0.91 between the economic efficiency and eco-efficiency scores, meanwhile 
environmental efficiency and eco-efficiency reports a value of 0.61. This means that the radial eco-efficiency of 
water policies is highly correlated with the economic efficiency. On the other hand, it has been confirmed that 
environmental impacts are not always related to the water use, and water pricing, even more water pricing 
enforcement may not be suitable to increase the environmental efficiency. Thus, under the research 
circumstances, the agricultural performance in the area may be slightly driven by a water pricing reform. Other 
policy instruments such as incentives, tradable permits, tax, standard emission or compliance like in the case of 
CAP should receive more attention. 
Finally, the comparison of the set options shows that their effect is not straightforward assuming a static 
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framework for decision-making, which also justifies further research in this direction. This can also be caused by 
several issues related to the case study, such as climate condition that makes the elasticity of water substitution 
among other production inputs very low, reducing the room for farm adaptation.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
The reform of water pricing methods is one of the most re-called requirements for the enhancement of the 
efficiency of using water and of its quality status. In order to change the pricing schemes as well as the charges, 
policy makers require a clear overview of the different outcomes deriving from alternative water management 
policies, and tools aimed at decision support are needed in order to select the most suitable option. 
In the present paper the relative economic and environmental efficiency of an agricultural system subject to 
alternative water pricing policies has been estimated using a methodology based on DEA. Water pricing policy 
has been evaluated taking into account economic and environmental goals in order to enhance the optimal 
pricing scheme as well as charging water sources considering the main agricultural system needs, in accordance 
with the ecological and economic principles of the WFD.  
DEA evaluation overcomes the usual trade-off or compromise amongst the conflicting objectives as economic 
and environmental issues, taking into account the eco-efficiency as criteria for the options ranking.  
The results obtained for the case study suggest that the potential gains of economic efficiency among the 
different water pricing options are relatively small. However, higher environmental efficiency gains could be 
achieved from water pricing scheme reforms. Despite the fact that the implementation of the volumetric pricing 
was expected to lead to a higher eco-efficiency, the area-based pricing method has proven to be the most 
eco-efficient in this case study. The output method also emerges as an interesting alternative. The enforcement of 
water saving via pricing charges does not imply a higher efficiency, mainly in the case of environmental 
efficiency.  
For current pricing systems, if the ‘full cost recovery’ principle prescribed in the WFD is applied via a rise in 
price, the result will be a decrease in eco-efficiency. This aspect is crucial in the Capitanata area as well as in 
other Mediterranean regions where water for irrigation accounts for 70-80% of total water consumption.  
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Notes 
Note 1. For a more in-depth discussion of DEA, the interested reader is referred to Cooper, Seiford, & Tone 
(2000) or the seminal work by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978).  
Note 2. Nitrate surplus and pesticide risk were chosen as indicators of the main agriculture pressures on the 
region according to the assessment carried out by the regional environmental agency (see PTA, 2009). In this 
regards, environmental variables should be referred to the relevant environmental issues according to each case 
study. 
Note 3. By relying on input oriented efficiency measures the approach takes an input perspective. Farmers 
maximize profit and respond to water policy changes by changing their cropping mix, which in turn affects the 
inputs use on farm. In addition, it is assumed that the farming exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS). In fact, 
under the short period assumptions they are constrained by the technology frontier and their individual constrains 
(i.e. farm size and water rights), so that the inefficiency scale does not face. 
 
Appendix 
Pay-off matrix  
Policy 
Land Labour Capital Water Value added 
Pesticides 
Risk 
Nitrogen 
surplus 
103 
hectares 10
3 hours 106 EUR 106 m3 106 EUR 103 Kg 106 t 
A_P0.Baseline 372.698 20.757 176.148 170.414 71.402 705.016 33.624 
A-P1. Full_Vol. 372.698 20.757 178.156 170.408 71.402 705.016 33.624 
A_P2.Input 377.059 21.149 179.222 174.433 74.464 758.586 32.519 
A_P3.Output 378.848 21.416 180.039 172.648 75.731 784.552 31.163 
A_P4.Area 379.525 21.852 181.568 171.276 78.580 742.750 33.088 
A_P5.Quota 372.730 20.841 175.844 173.911 72.488 711.049 33.802 
B_P0.Baseline 373.253 20.280 172.841 151.474 65.153 687.872 33.545 
B_P1. Full_Vol. 373.261 20.271 175.176 151.112 65.035 687.311 33.539 
B_P2.Input 377.747 20.671 175.828 152.667 67.545 745.416 31.669 
B_P3.Output 378.149 20.559 175.246 151.456 66.356 762.805 30.990 
B_P4.Area 378.783 21.188 177.903 152.575 70.438 725.091 31.860 
B_P5.Quota 371.990 19.878 169.409 152.655 62.366 692.107 33.350 
C_P0.Baseline 372.403 19.872 168.535 137.826 60.193 658.483 33.208 
C_P1. Full_Vol. 372.332 19.926 171.483 136.952 60.432 654.936 33.166 
C_P2.Input 377.479 20.097 171.487 132.227 60.127 718.277 30.867 
C_P3.Output 376.850 19.494 169.023 133.793 55.922 736.342 30.806 
C_P4.Area 376.966 19.933 168.814 134.222 58.764 703.896 31.256 
C_P5.Quota 371.382 19.272 164.871 137.479 55.518 673.871 32.676 
Source: Own elaboration from Giannoccaro et al. (2010). 
 
